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Summary This paper deals with comparisons of situation in quality of power supply regulation in some of European 
countries, which are interested in CEER (Council of European Energy Regulators). Especially we focused our analysis on 
reliability indices, relationship between supplier and consumer and electric power supply aftereffects. There are discussed 
differences in each countries and comparison with situation in Czech Republic.  
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Through all European countries liberalization of 
electric energy market was finished. It brings new 
Technical, Economical and Legislation problems. 
One of these problems is relationship between 
customers and suppliers and standardization of 
quality of electric power supply. Incentive/penalty 
regime seems to be one of the possible solutions. 
2. RELIABILITY INDICES [3] 
Most of European countries use these reliability 
indices for reliability measurement and analysis: 
o „System Average Interruption Duration 
Index” (SAIDI), in some countries it is used 
“Customer Minutes Lost per customer per 
year” (CMLs). 
o “System Average Interruption Frequency 
Index” (SAIFI), it is also used “Customer 
Interruption per 100 customers per year” 
(CIs).  
o “Momentary Average Interruption 
Frequency Index” (MAIFI). 
o “Energy not supply” (ENS). 
o “Average Interruption Time” (AIT). 
 
 There five reliability indices are usually reported 
annually in most European countries. SAIDI, SAIFI 
and MAIFI are often divided to planned and 
unplanned. Reliability indices used for distribution 
networks in European countries. 
 SAIFI, SAIDI and MAIFI per High, Medium and 
Low voltage level (HL, ML, LL) are monitored in 
Great Britain, Hungary, Italy and Norway. 
 SAIDI and SAIFI per HL, ML, LL are monitored 
in Greece, Portugal, France, Lithuania and Norway. 
 SAIDI and SAIFI per HL, ML are monitored in 
Slovenia and Belgium (Walloon). 
 SAIDI and SAIFI at all voltage level are 
monitored in Sweden, Estonia and Ireland. 
 Average duration and frequency per contracted 
power etc. are monitored in Austria, Spain, Finland, 
Portugal and Norway. 
 Here it is big difference between distribution and 
transmission networks. Reliability indices used for 
transmission networks. 
 ENS is monitored in Finland, France, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Great Britain and Norway. 
 There are used also other indices like AIT, 
SAIDI, SAIFI and other in different countries. 
 There are not monitored reliability indices at 
transmission level in Austria, Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia and Slovenia.  
  
 In Czech Republic are monitored SAIDI and 
SAIFI at distribution and transmission networks. 
Total time of interruption is monitored at 
transmission level too. The problem is, that there is 
no audit pursued by any authorities e.g. regulator, 
distribution companies or consultants in Czech 
Republic to made these data sets more credible and 
reliable.      
   
3. STANDARDS AND INCENTIVES IN 
QUALITY REGULATION [3] 
 This part of article deals with standards and 
incentive/penalty arrangements regulating quality of 
electric power supply. 
 Customer surveys are one of the most important 
forms of measurement of quality of electric power 
supply. But it is very important to realize customer 
survey widely, because only wide customer survey 
can bring relevant data about customer satisfaction, 
expectation and Willingness to Pay (WTP) for 
quality of electric power supply. 
 There are three common methods for customer 
surveys: 
o Customer satisfaction (Used in Portugal, 
Hungary, Italy or Great Britain) 
o Customer expectations and importance of 
quality factors (Portugal, Italy, Great 
Britain) 





















Reasons and methods of customer surveys realized 
by national energy regulator: 
o Customer surveys on Willingness to pay 
were realized in Norway, Italy, Great 
Britain and Sweden. 
o Customer surveys on expectations and 
importance of quality factors were realized 
in Hungary and Italy 
o Customer surveys on satisfaction were 
realized in Hungary, Italy Great Britain and 
Portugal 
 
 In Greece there is customer survey under 
preparation in will realized in few years. 
 In other European countries were not yet 
customer surveys realized, e.g. Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland  and Slovenia. 
 Only 8 European countries use incentive/penalty 
method to regulate quality of electric power supply: 
o Italy from 2000 
o Norway and Ireland from 2001 
o Great Britain from 2002 
o Hungary and Portugal from 2003 
o Sweden from 2004 
o Estonia from 2005 
 
 Other countries prepare start of incentive/penalty 
regime from 2008 (Finland, France, Lithuania) in 
near future Poland, Spain, Slovenia. 
 
4. THEORETICAL MODEL OF 
INCENTIVE/PENALTY REGIME 
 
 There are a lot of theoretical possibilities of 
using incentive/penalty scheme. We describe only 4 
basic models of incentive/penalty schemes. 
 For theoretical model we use Portugal 
incentive/penalty scheme with parameters from 
2005. Portugal is the most comparable country to 
Czech Republic in EU. It is modification of Fig. 1d.   
 







Fig.  1b. Incentive/penalty scheme  
 
 
Fig.  1c. Incentive/penalty scheme 
 
Fig.  1d. Incentive/penalty scheme  
 
 There is energy not supply (ENS) used as a 
reliability parameter in this model. In some countries 
is only one parameter used in incentives/penalty 
scheme (only SAIDI) in some countries are used 
SAIDI and SAIFI together (two incentives/penalty 
systems). 
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Values used in this theoretical model [3]: 
o The incentive is symmetric (not necessary) 
and related to a reference value (target) of 
the Energy Not Supply (ENSREF). 
o Dead bands are used (not necessary). 
o If the value of ENS in a given year is less 
than ENSREF – V, which means that the 
network had a good performance, the 
distributors’ revenues are increased by an 
amount RQS (revenues for quality of 
supply). RQS is computed using a per-unit-
value of the ENS, VENS and is proportional 
to the difference between the actual ENS in 
the year and the target ENSREF-V: 
 
( )ENS REFRQS V ENS V ENS= ⋅ − ∆ −  , (1) 
 
o If the value of ENS in a given year is 
greater than ENSREF + V, which means 
that the network had a bad performance, the 
distributors’ revenues are decreased by an 
amount RQS. RQS is computed using a 
per-unit-value of the ENS, VENS, and is 
proportional to the difference between the 
actual ENS in the year and the target 
ENSREF-V: 
 
( )ENS REFRQS V ENS ENS V= ⋅ − + ∆  , (2) 
   
o If the value of ENS in a given year is near 
ENSREF value, the distributors’ revenues are 
not affected. (RQS=0) 
 
REF REFENS V ENS ENS V− ∆ ≤ ≤ + ∆ , (3) 
  
Portugal model with parameters from 2005: 
o The reward and the penalty have the same 
maximum value 
 
5 000 000 €MIN MAXRQS RQS= =  , (4) 
 
o Target ENSREF=0,0004 x ES (ES – energy 
supplied in the year) 
o Dead band: ± V=0,12 x ENSREF 
o Value of ENS: VENS =1,5 €/kWh 
 
 
On the basis of these theoretical bases we tried 
to apply Portugal incentives/penalty model to Czech 
power energy environment. 
o The reward and the penalty have the same 
maximum value. We set maximum 
penalty/incentives value as a 1% of annul 
profit of EZ Group (2005) it is 
223 000 000 CZK (about 7 500 000 €, 1€ ∼ 
29,784 CZK in average from 2005).  
 
7 500 000 €MIN MAXRQS RQS= =  , (5) 
 
o Target ENSREF=0,0004 x ES (ES – energy 
supplied in the year, it is 52 397 GWh in 
2004 in Czech Republic – newest data, data 
from 2005 are not still available) 
o Dead band: ± V=0,12 x ENSREF 
o Value of ENS: Setting of value of ENS is 
very difficult and it was not make a large 
customer survey to set value of ENS for 
various types of customer e.g. large 
industrial, small consumers, small 
industrial (business) customer. We made a 
detail analysis of outage costs in one large 
industrial enterprise and found out that 
value of ENS for this case is around 
5€/kWh. But it depends on many variables 
and it can not represent all Czech industrial 





Fig.  3. Application of Incentive/penalty scheme of 
Portugal model to the Czech conditions and values.  
(Only example for this specific situation and conditions) 
 
 
Values of ENS in other European countries [3]: 
o Great Britain – Average value of ENS is 
4,18 €/kWh. 
o Ireland – Average value of ENS is 7,20 
€/kWh. 
o Italy – Differentiated according to type of 
consumers (domestic and business) is 10,80 
and 21,60 €/kWh. 
o Norway – Differentiated according to type 
of consumers and to type of outage 
(unplanned and planned). Industrial 7,90 – 
5,51, Trade/Service 11,86 – 8,14, 
Agricultural 1,80 – 1,20, Residential 0,96 – 
0,84, Public service 1,56 – 1,20, Wood 
processing/energy intensive industry 1,56 – 
1,62 €/kWh. 
o Portugal – Average value of ENS is 1,50 
€/kWh. 
o Sweden – Value of ENS is differentiated 
according to density of line and type of 
outage (planned and unplanned), Urban 12 
– 8,6; Suburban 8,8 – 6,3; Rural 7,4 – 5,5 
RQS [€] 
7 500 000 €
 
18,4  23,5 21  ENS [GWh]  
Penalty 
Incentives 
Slope = VENS = 5€/kWh 
7 500 000 €
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€/kWh Urban 2,5 – 0,4; Suburban 1,9 – 0,3; 
Rural 1,9 – 0,2 €/kW (Value of lost load).      
 
Reliability indicators used in incentives/penalty 
schemes in various European countries [3]:  
o CML, CI in Great Britain 
o Outage rate, Number of MV faults per grid 
length, Average repair time of MV 
network, Average number of LV grouped 
faults, SAIDI, SAIFI, Percentage of 
interruptions restored within 3 and within 
24 hours in Hungary 
o SAIDI and Losses in Ireland 
o SAIDI in Italy 
o ENS in Norway, Portugal 
o SAIDI, SAIFI in Sweden  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDATION 
System of incentives/penalty scheme seems to be 
the most comfortable utility to regulate quality of 
electric power supply. Experience with this scheme 
shows that system of incentives and penalty had a 
direct impact on quality of electric power supply in 
European countries e.g. Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, 
Hungary and Norway. 
There is a big problem in reliability data 
collection in Czech Republic, because only global 
reliability parameters are watched. It is not possible 
to set reliability parameters of each overhead power 
lines and cable lines in Czech Republic. 
If we can start with incentives/penalty 
arrangement in Czech Republic first of all we must 
change reliability data collection system. After that 
we must set quality of electric power supply 
standards as for example limits of SAIDI and SAIFI. 
At the end we must set limits for RQS, we must 
make decision about using dead band and symmetry 
of incentives. Type of incentives and penalty must 
be set too, we can choose from automatic or on 
request scheme.  
Probably the biggest and the most difficult 
problem will be setting of value of energy not 
supplied (VENS). 
Our ENS value survey shows a lot of problems 
with calculation of ENS value for example: 
o Type of customer 
o Industrial (large, small) 
o Commercial (large, small) 
o Domestic 
o Public service 
o Other…  
o Type of outage (EN 50160) 
o Transient 
o Short interruption 
o Long interruption 
o Type of outage (planned, unplanned) 
Finally national regulatory authorities must set all 
of these standards and make final decision about 
acceptation of incentives/penalty scheme in Czech 
Republic. 
We will still continue with analyzing of electric 
power supply quality standards in European 
countries at Department of electric power 
engineering VŠB-TU Ostrava.  
Most of the information about quality of electric 
power supply is two year old so it is possible that 
evaluation of quality of electric power supply 
standardization may be changed in details in some 
European countries, but it has no influence on 
methodology of electric power supply quality 
regulation.     
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